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REPLY BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdlcatlon over 
this matter based upon appellant Winter's timely filing of a 
Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment 
while there were issues of material fact to be tried. 
Northwest Pipeline Corporation (herein, "NWP") fired the 
appellant WINTER from his executive position after he was with 
the company for 5 months when he reported to NWP that he had 
personally reviewed NWP's natural gas well-head field 
operations and found many of them in various states of 
disrepair. Many of them were leaking gas. Others were 
unprotected from threatening external damage. It was deemed 
that these operations were an unsafe environment in which 
ftot 
employees should/N be expected to work. A verbal and written 
report of this Internal Safety Audit was produced for NWP. It 
urged specific remedial attention. These findingswere met with 
unreasonable NWP opposition and the claim that accidents were 
forseeable and likely was ignored. 
1 
In retaliation for talking like a "Whistle-blower" the 
appellant/s supervisor retaliated by raising imaginary 
pretextual issues for the purpose of creating oppression and 
duress. The work environment suddenly became hostile and 
poisoned by accusations of criminal conduct and carrying a 
concealed handgun for which there was no basis in fact. The 
motive being to cause the appellant's resignation. When the 
appellant decided to tough-it out, appellant was fired. 
However, over the appellant's objections NWP claimed that the 
appellant "voluntarily resigned and quit". A "quit" is a bar 
to unemployment benefits all to the appellant's legal 
detriment. NWP owed the appellant several thousand dollars in 
reimbursable relocation expenses. All these funds were 
withheld on a punative basis for more than two years during 
which time the appellant was blacklisted. When the trial court 
granted summary judgment it held the appellant to be an at-will 
employee and considered none of the exceptions to that 
doctrine. Two months after the appellant's termination the 
"forseeable" accident material!zedwhen a truck impacted with an 
unprotected well-head deemed earlier to be unsafe. The well 
blew-out uncontrollably for more than a week. Fortunately 
there was no ignition and no one was killed. Government 
investigators convened to assess blame and NWP was hopeful to 
attribute the accident to an act of god so as to escape 
liability. Concerned that the "BAR" might fall into an 
investigator's hands NWP contacted the appellant to say that 
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they had $5,000 for me after the well-head investigation was 
settled provided the appellant didn't do something stupid like 
volunteer a copy of the SAR. The appellant was not interested 
in causing trouble; about two years later he was the recipient 
of $5,000. NWP called it a "separation91 benifit. The irony of 
-this whole affair is that with NWP's check I was now able to go 
to the unemployment insurance people to produce evidence of a 
"separaton benefit11 that indicated that the appellant hadn't 
voluntarily resigned and quit after all. Some of the 
Unemployment Insurance benefits were released. Within a few 
more months NWP also released the relocation reimbursement it 
had been holding. 
3 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED 
FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS 
Appellant believes that the defendants at trial 
failed to support their summary judgment motion 
with affidavits or declarations showing there is 
no triable issue as to a material fact and were 
not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy eliminating 
trial and therefore the moving party's 
declarations must be strictly construed and the 
opposing party's declarations liberally construed. 
If there is any issue of material fact to be tried, 
summary judgment must be denied. 
Doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment 
should be resolved against the moving party. 
The moving party's showing must establish facts which 
negate the opponent's claim and justify a judgment 
in the moving party's favor. 
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6. It is the moving party's burden to make a sufficient 
showing that the claim is entirely without merit 
and if that showing is deficient summary judgment 
must be denied. 
7. The motion must stand self-sufficient and cannot 
succeed because the opposition is weak. 
8. A party cannot succeed without disproving eventhose 
claims on which the opponent would have the burden 
of proof at trial. 
9. Summary judgment motion raises only questions of law 
regarding the construction and effect of the 
moving and opposing papers and therefore they are 
subject to independent review on appeal. 
10. The trial court incorrectly focused on the 
plaintiff/s burden rather than that of the 
defendant as the moving party. 
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ISSUES FOR THE TRIER OF FACT 
The following items are believed to be material issues 
of fact for the trier of fact that should have precluded 
summary judgment: 
1. Can an employer fire an employee who he asks to provide 
certain extra ordinary goods and services above and 
beyond those for which he was ordinarily hired to 
provide prior to the time he pays the off the employee 
for those extra ordinary goods and services that VjJ&ce 
requested. 
When NWP asked WINTER to underwrite the costs of his 
relocation to Salt Lake City, pending the completion of the 
relocation, it contracted for an extraordinary service by an 
employee above and beyond that for which he was hired. Because 
of the legal detriment incurred due to this request, NWP was 
not entitled to fire the employee prior to the time it paid off 
the legal detriment incurred on its behalf, if at all. NWP 
owed WINTER $2,&Ll* which it paid more than two years after 
firing WINTER. Under this maxim, NWP would owe WINTER his 
backwages until it cured the debt incurred on its behalf. 
2. When an employer falsely maintains over a period of years 
that his ex-employee resigned and quit, and precludes 
the employee from access to his unemployment insurance 
benefits, the employee should be entitled to his normal 
wages on the ground^that the employee did not quit. The 
employer should not be entitled to have it both ways. 
3. Why isn't NWP and R. Janita Reid liable for fraudulent 
misrepresentation when they made it appear that the 
appellant voluntarily resigned and quit f they 
certified under penalty of law that he did,]* The 
employer should not be entitled to claim employee 
\h\fote the 
resignation when it suits it;on the one hand.andAat-will 
doctrine when its advantageous on the other? 
4. Did NWP bribe the appellant when it paid him $5,000 to 
prevent disclosure of its failure to cure a known 
hazzardous condition that lead to the blow-out of August 
13, 1981? (su^cuyr)* 
5. Did NWP cause intentional interference with economic 
advantage? 
6. Interference with a contract between WINTER and U/DES. 
7 
Did NWP act with bad faith and unfair dealing?. 
(the employee is precluded from ^e^pfoMtf^i taStffa^ CfiT), 
Does the employers conduct represent bad faith and 
unfair dealing? 
Did NWP and R. Janita Reid fraudulently misrepresent that 
the appellant voluntarily resigned and quit when they 
certified under penalty of law that he did. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
There are three notable exceptions to the at-will rule 
which limit an employer's freedom to terminate its employees. 
These are: 
1. Violation of public policy 
when he-
The appellant was dismissed A reported that the 
conditions in the work place were unsafe. In retaliation the 
employer may not fire the employee in retribution or 
retaliation because the employee is entitled to work in a safe 
and secure environment as a matter of public policy. 
2. Breach of an express or implied contract to fire only 
for cause 
Employee agreed to provide the employer with 
goods and services and benefits above and beyond those 
associated with employees normal duties. The employer was in 
debt to the employee. The employer is not entitled to fire the 
employee until he has paid the employee for those goods and 
services that were contributed to the employer above and beyond 
those provided in the normal course of work. (oOOxts o^oj. 
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Employee was 50 years old for which the employer 
agreed to provide employment for 15 years. In anticipation of 
that agreed employment the employee incurred a legal detriment. 
The employer may not breach their mutual agreement so as to 
ignore the legal detriment incurred by the employee. 
3. Breach of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
Employer claimed that employee resigned and 
plausibly denied any knowledge for the quit. When the employee 
proved that he had not quit the employer is estopped from 
invoking the at-will doctrine by claiming that employee's 
performance is unsatisfactory. 
In conjunction with these exceptions other causes of 
action were pled: 
1. Discrimination 
Appellant's employer "fired11 him and deliberately 
falsified the record under penalty of law to indicate that the 
appellant gave his "resignation11 and "quit1'. The employer 
wanted to deny the appellant a cause of action against him for 
"wrongful termination". In doing so the employer prevented the 
appellant from timely access to unemployment insurance benefits 
for which he was in need. For over two years the employer 
stonewalled the appellant's many requests to correct the record 
10 
and ill refused to do MO when " every opportunll,y lo 
capricious act and deliberate falsification of records were 
discriminatory and violated the appellant's civil right 
• 
2 Negligent and intentional inflicatior of emotional 
distress 
a fired employee resigned and quit which acted"bar the employee 
froi in in me mployment insurance benefits; si .multaneously employer 
withheld relocation expenses payable I :: s n ip] <:> | e > EI f : iii: in t :: it: ^  a Il: Jit ; JII : , 
two years i Employer's conduct *i extreme and outrageous. 
Emplo| ex wilfu t M,ed A documents government in 
support of . his itrocious and indecent m lie 
consequence of employer's acts denied the employee funds 
necessa x j a ^ndition i i hi • : lit th a • E mployee 
suffered damages. Employer's acts were intentional for 
the employer suffered severe emotional suffering. The employer 
i i11 I „i i" "1 i f h i . " 11I'll , • ' P ! "»fi 1 i f w ' i p|n"i'f I « I, » 
3. Unlawful reprisal, and 
The appellant did i .n :I nternal Safety Audit of 
sai is :I ii t h s IIJ ox kpl » • findings. 
findiB report of unsafe * - - nfuriated 
appellant' mploye that lie retaliated against appellent 
by 
oppression designed to force the appellant to quit. Refusing 
11 Il 
to :ji :ii:i f: the appellant was fired 'i 1 prevent the employee from 
access iin'iiipl c |»iriHiii i n^ uirain, e llio employer claimed t»*iat the 
employee , 'resigned*1 barred the employee i x 0111 1 
benefits 
I Breach 
Employee agreed to provide the employer with goods 
and services and benefits above and beyond those associated 
with employees normal duti s s• The ni|i II 111 1111 u 1  1 ::! n :! a I: t t 1: • the 
employee. The employez 1 1 entitled to fire the employee 
unt nas paid the employee for those goods and services 
that were contributed 
provided in the normal course of work. 
Employ ^ears old f >r which the employer 
agreed ±~ provide employment toi y e a r S j mticipn 
thai agreed employment the employee incurred a legal detrimei 
The empll i,f not agreement &%J aa ^ 
ignore the legal detriment incurred by the employee. 
I "I I" III Il .I'll l u l l If Ml nil "Ill II 111 I 
Blacklisting statute 
Whistle-blowers statute (sup.R. 13>J VO 
- 12 -
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
appellant, A. P. Winter (herein, "WINTER") 
was the «& su executive who was recruited from out 
state for * an BM e c 1  it:! >i 113 a n fil  m a n a g e r > 1 II llo 1  
Pipeline Corporatior (herein, "NWP") Reserves and Evaluations 
Dupart moiit if I Hi n Production. vision. WINTER una a I oy 
employee had been continuously tunphiyed 1*1:101: In I In 1 M 
position, and had an unblemished record. He reported to K*»n 
S t r a r I I IM> I IJ! 111, "STRACKE") " rector II II 11 p 1  0 1 I 1 1 0 It i o n 
Division. WINTER had a staff of approximate!y 1S people who 
tested natural gas wells :i 1:1 M'ev Mexd co, Colorado, Wyoming, and 
gas reservoirs and their useful life when connected to NWF* 
gas transmission line. 
Prior to WINTER'S appointment his department had 
experience considerable turnover and NWP's STRACKE asked WINTER 
for duration 5 years. WINTER agreed to do so and 
contract for that purpose on that basis. 1 return STRACKE and 
from San Diego and t: : ^ provide other incentives, such as a 
$10' il il 0 signature bonus, and other perquisites. Among these 
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weio Included I lie ? »ijiit >o attend advanced engineering short 
, - 1 1 i i t»p abreast of technical developments in the area 
cif reservoir engineering. 
I n I: li. s • 3' m i s e :: ii:* h i s • € mp] :>f WINTER fljliii • ill i i ji Internal 
Safety Audit of certain, field operations in which his stair was 
required to work He observed first hand that the conditions 
'at . i cans gas I - instructed and 
represented ~ -* to the health and welfare of NWP employees. 
WINTER c >: .reported M s findings t. :> STRACKE and followed 
urgent recommendations, recommendations were generally two 
xn number. First i I was obsei: ved that the NWP's gas we] ] s 
common elsewhere. Well-heads f other companys a re usually 
protected , , erimeter of steel posts to prevent accidental 
col 1 i 3ion I " I uivi ce vehicles• Accidental a engage of a gas 
well-head could forseeably result in an explosive blowout and 
fatal injuries Fc r t .li.:i s reason the urgent implementation of 
thi s recommendation was planned. Thl s required NWP's urgent 
attention. Secondly, I I i§as observed that many NWP gas wells 
* ' f :l c :1 € m 1 i i ere sub j e n ,• I I a evere 1 eakage
 f 
ana iesigned I: : ' retain the pressures to 
were exposed. WINTER recommended that all such marginal 
i - ti o in mi 1111111! 11 v ill mi 111 * "I in mi "i I i il I * n s i b 1 HI "in i il 11 In i» i' w 1 J e 
replaced WINTER told STRACKE that without the implementation 
14 
of these safety measures the a major accident was forseeable 
wltb the possible loss OJ. JLAJL©. 
lii Internal Safety Audit Report had never been done at 
11 ( an i ' be fore > n t i " ,: il STRACKE was upset il Jit. si t WINTER had memorial 1 zed 
his findings. He asked that WINTER destroy .nil copies before 
OSHA Miners Management iService of (I Ii ie apartment c>f 
: . unsafe opernl Ion i,i WINTER opposed 
doing so. STRACKE thereafter became quite hostile. He called 
WINTEi •Whistle-blowe!" *nd things started going downhill 
i i II • ::  11 i l l fill n :>l p a r n i i i I  Ii iii I 
Audit Report recommendations. 
began 11 program of "disinformation" against INTER il 11 
retaliation for providing an J internal Safety Audit Report 
started off wi ill an absurd accusation that WINTER is known to 
carz y a hand- g 1 in • an lii s |i \wm\ <n 1 .nd is a danger others 
so il 1:1 Utah il  is > it felony. There was 1  1 to t iAC&g's 
allegation. WINTER denied the charge while STRACKE seemed 
enjoy NTER was powerless 
: WINTER lii 111 asked, why me? STRACKE stonewa. wiwxi^i 
was not known until after this suit was fi 1 ed that others 
involved 1 III I II 1 JWUCJ. ,0! Il"1 retribut 1 on hard-bal STRACKE 
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enlisted two willing surogates to maliciously spread the ru mor 
I: .ha I: WINTER carries • a concealed hand-gun. This they cl:i d 1: oth 
inside utside the company, .it deposition, Shannon Hanks 
(herein, "HANKS") STRACKE' ecretary admitted to defaming 
WINTFH i i mi I ill I Il i " - i i 1 1 " • < > i ;l 3|! 
(herein, MHALEIV) STRACKE'a major dorno admitted spreading 
this malicious tale 1INTER did not realize *t the time but 
NTRACKE WiiH 1 ii\i I'l  i» • Eid il n 1 berate sabol Aije. 
STRACKE wanted to for ce WINTER li of: the company through 
harassment, oppression, and duress. STRACKE didn't wai it to the 
come back to M ii i :i It: I t iii cause c f action for wrongful 
discharge. H opted for creating an unhappy and contentious 
atmosphere the lope of forcing 1 1\ N T M R " ,«i '""""ireftJ vjiwil I m i " . 
WINTER withstood this barrage of dirty tricks and pretextual 
:i ssi ies« But , on Il  in iici ,,€ 22 Il 981 STRACKE told WINTER to pack his 
things, and to col lect hi s pay... "This is your last day. •• 
STRACKE would now claim that WINTER "resigned91, He had not. 
On the pretextual Jssr- ~# * concealed weapon, it is 
remarkable that • s i e it, mi it :>ii Ill: Ji en attorney for NWP, Teresa 8 i 1 cox, 
B. I • i I!: , i: i "I .< i i • I f gi" J 3 )
 t i > W I N T F I H « in "in "s 
deposition, li€i testified that he owned a gin ! lilies mipl Itau by 
t h e c o n t e x t o f 1: ,er c l a im t h a t ::i t I s a. o n c e a l a b l e weapon when 
Shame on y c)i,:i ILCOX. Are ii HI t:c> b e l i e v e t h a t you !ic> mc t / 
111 IS 
the difference betweei i , i handgun and a rifle? You just shot 
y o u r s o I. ( I in : ill in d uili 
STRACKE made every effort i "blacklist" WINTER 
prt5 oyment Th ,li ,l! " • il o<; nine n t e d :il! n t l a II el i 
Lee Drake (Sup.R. 1419 , i, ^  1 STRACKE's deposition (Sup 
935) i he i e I lie admits > * going out of his way to track WINTER 
STRACKE even admits to having third parties phone him from 
across the nation for the sole purpose of tracking WINTER so 
can harass him (Sup, 1.9 10) (Sup.R.950) as lie dl § in 
in 1985 when he incredibly tried to eject WINTER by physically 
grabbing lis a m . feuf.^ * *k><l) » 
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The economic impact of being fired il s severe in all 
CMSos * * in the middle ^ i 
process of relocating for your employer-
January of 1981 the appellant was tun i Northwest 
Pipeline 
was continuously employed. MWP hired the appellant (,o w iiiilli i n 
S a l t - 1 riit ty• The appel 1 ant was eceive $62,300 {Sup• R• 
659 I il!'I in m m urn 1 il u m € xecutj i 
a nd Evaluations. (see Exhibi 
NWP the employee was required 
and . permanent i -
NWP sponsored relocatic . 
to La* would reguir 
appellant's wife arranged 
things :i i i , order.. The appellant had 
school bh€ : ti € r il n c .ol 1 eg e 1 h e 
Lake City • on January 19th, 1981 and 
Iil anticipation of his family joining him. In this transition 
were subst because of ihe 
necessit of temporarily maintaining households, one lit Han 
Diego, th
 y ^ icentive t 
I1, Hi ' tNei v e s 
-. document) lir"o -join 
h i s house i n liiiii hi I-M|O 
1 1 : 11 in Ik i;«i i Il il" (II II 111 Ill 
ansition from San Diego 
onths while •hp 
III III I ' l l I S ! HI I III 1 I j H J l 
•i chi1dren, o n e 111 I m 11 j u 
began work in Salt 
leased a 
cation expenses icluded payment for estate 
commission associated with selling appellant's California 
^ 
i uence, aiiu living expenses in Salt Lake 
cit *" ^ aonths. >f necessity frequent a, I i: travel between 
Sal Diego during this transition period was 
required. 
travel expenses were also >orne by the employer, MWP. 
O n J1 i i n e 2 2 n 31, 1! 9 8 3 a p p r o x I um I m o i i l IIIILI I 11 1  < 
NWP, the appellant was "fired11. The economic blot 
stacjgeri nq., The appellant's wages from NWP were his only 
source at income, i 1! Il other funds in e z • e t ,:i e< 1 " i if :i n t h e iiiiii ' Mir I i 
Sal _ Although NWF promised reimburse (,,,e 
< ^location expenses, h s : ras told once oined NWP 
1 at. he to pay his relocat expensi 
until his relocation to Salt Lake City was completed. MWP told 
t -li a app e ; lat : *] if ocation invoice was permitted on 
any particular move. Although the appellant: axocation to 
Salt Lake City was i:i :: II: complete when ' :.i:ed bh e 
appellant :i: ounded up a Il Il hd s ei. -v vouch**, immediately 
submitted them to I'l'l eimbursement. NWP refused their 
immediate payment pending leretofore unusual decision 
type-up the tez s s • i it 
appellant' request for payment; a, totally unnecessary delay. 
Appellant requested as an alternative a partial payment. NWP 
to wait for the entire amount. Although appellant remained 
in frequent contact with NWP on this matter, it took 1.5 years 
before NWP decided to release a payment. When payment was 
released appellant received a net of only $2,62.1* (Sup.R.\5(£)) out 
of the $3,000 (Sup.R. ) in expenses that were submitted. 
Without the benefit of interest the net present value of the 
amount received was worth considerably less. The appellant 
received a check on March 22, 1983 in the amount of $2,400. 
NWP's dilatory tactics in making a timely payment of relocation 
expenses were plainly outrageous and abusive. The unequal 
standing between NWP and the appellant made for an uneven 
playing field against which the appellant had no recourse • 
At the time of his firing the appellant was strung out 
financially with no income, a house in San Diego in escrow, an 
extended lease committment on a condo in Salt Lake City, 
furniture in transit, NWP withholding the reimbursement of 
funds already spent on the relocation to Salt Lake City, the 
likelihood of having to re-relocate back to San Diego, and no 
prospects at-hand for re-employment. It was a time of great 
worry, emotional stress, and humiliation. 
These problems aside, it was essential that the 
appellant find a job. But there was another problem, the need 
for cash for current living expenses. The appellant needed to 
apply for unemployment insurance benefits. Unemployment 
insurance is designed to provide prompt payment and 
20 
availability of benefits to meet current needs. Application 
was made to the Utah Department of Employment Security (herein, 
"U/DES") on June 23, 1981. U/DES contacted NWP based upon the 
appellant's application. U/DES was told that NWP opposed 
payment to the appellant on the grounds that he was 
ineligible. NWP claimed that the appellant had "voluntarily 
resigned and quit91. An employee who resigns is barred from any 
unemployment insurance benefits. NWP/s personnel manager, R. 
Juanita Reid (herein, "REID") certified (Sup.R.984) in writing 
under penalty of law to U/DES, an agency of the federal 
government, that the appellant had "quit11 and that NWP was 
opposed to being charged for any benefits that appellant may 
claim. REID, on behalf of NWP wilfully made a false statement 
or representation, with actual knowledge of its falsity to an 
agency of the government, U/DES. The appellant did not resign, 
nor did he authorize anyone to claim that he had. U/DES denied 
the appellant's application for unemployment insurance benefits 
based upon REID'S perjured statement. The appellant filed an 
appeal. This only added to the appellant's problems, his 
worry, and his emotional distress. The appellant called upon 
NWP to correct the record but neither REID nor Ken Stracke 
(herein, "STRACKE") the appellant's superior at NWP would talk 
to the appellant. The appellant wrote them both letters but 
neither would reply. Unless there was some evidence to bring 
forward to U/DES upon the appeal of its ruling to deny 
benefits, the appellant's appeal was would be futile. NWP was 
engaged in a coverup and wished to "window dress" its "firing" 
21 
of the appellant so as to appear to be a "resignation". NWP, 
REID, and STRACKB acted maliciously in doing so. They knew 
that their stance in this matter was wrong, they knew that it 
would have a detrimental effect on the appellant, and yet they 
did nothing to mitigate the appellant's damages by coming 
forward to correct the record when they had every opportunity 
to do so over a period of two years. The appellant 
continuously objected to NWP's characterization of his "firing11 
as a "resignation". However, NWP maintained this fraud for 
2.8 years. All NWP officials knew what the truth was but would 
not correct the record. STRACKE, the director of the 
production division knew, REID, the personnel manager knew, and 
Robert Keener (herein, "KEENER"), a senior vice-president 
knew. Yet they all claimed they had no-knowledge as to why the 
appellant left NWP even after the appellant brought suit 
against NWP and they all had read the complaint. NWP's 
fraudulent conduct constituted illegal discrimination. The 
real reason that NWP wanted it to appear that the appellant 
handed in his "resignation" was simply that they knew that by 
11
 firing11 the appellant they provided him with a cause of action 
for "wrongful discharge19. But in doing so NWP found itself on 
the horns of a dilemma. By maintaining that the appellant 
"resigned11 NWP found itself culpable for illegal 
discrimination and the violation of the appellant's Civil 
Rights by preventing his timely access of unemployment 
benefits. By admitting that the appellant was "fired91 NWP 
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exposed itself to a cause of action for discharging the 
appellant for "blowing the whistle" and a cause of action for 
"wrongful discharge". 
NWP's conduct served no ethical or business purpose. 
What purposes it served were unscrupulous, tainted, and 
malicious. NWP's claim that the appellant resigned was 
motivated solely to coverup its own mismanagement and to hide 
the fact that the appellant's "firing" was retaliatory and in 
violation of public policy. 
To the uninformed it just doesn't make much sense that a 
large corporation with millions of dollars in annual revenue 
should conduct itself with malice, subterfuge, duplicity, and 
double dealing by insisting that the appellant "resigned" when 
he in fact was "fired". The reason is that the appellant 
Why would NWP NWP nevertheless felt that could weather the 
appellant's challenge and that it could "stonewall" the matter, 
that is, until it had to eventually explain its contradictory 
conduct and behavior. However, events would betray NWP's 
errant conduct and its self-serving motive for this action. As 
a consequence NWP didn't even blink when it reneged on its 
employment agreement with the appellent. The quid pro quo was: 
job security and long term employment for the appellant in 
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return for his promise to relocate and pledge to remain with 
NWP for the next 15 years. 
At the time NWP hired the appellant, NWP was in a bind. 
Neil Foley, the previous Manager of Reserves and Evaluations, 
had "jumped ship" with no notice to start his own business. 
He took several NWP staff members with him in doing so. When 
NWP took a large ad in the Oil and Gas Journal seeking his 
replacement, NWP was hurting. Prior Neil Foley NWP experienced 
repeated turnover for the same position. To prevent such a 
recurrence from happening again, NWP and STRACKE had the 
appellant pledge his committment to stay with NWP for the next 
15 years. At that point in time the appellant would be ready 
for retirement. In justifiable reliance upon this mutual 
covenant the appellant committed himself to relocate and agreed 
to the obligations in doing so. These obligations were above 
and beyond those associated with providing his professional 
services concurrent with his employment. The appellant had to 
give up the exploitation of patents previously issued to him. 
In addition the appellant had to sell his house in San Diego, 
purchase another in Salt Lake, and transport his household and 
family almost 1000 miles away. All these things necessitated 
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that the appellent incur a substantial financial obligation. 
The appellant cheerfully agreed to undertake this obligation in 
justifiable reliance of NWP's committments to him. The 
appellant never dreamed that NWP would "sandbag" him by asking 
him to leave his prior employment elsewhere, and allow him to 
incurr the substantial legal detriment required in relocating, 
only to be abandoned without warning because of NWP's 
capricious whim. 
The appellant did not obligate himself to NWP for the 
purposes of placing his household and his family in transit for 
a temporary position of 5 months duration in Salt Lake City. 
NWP asked the appellant to make it a committment, not as an 
at-will employee. It asked the appellant for a contract 
committment extending 15 years at the rate of $62,500 per year. 
This situation is not unlike that in which NWP contracts to buy 
a piece of equipment. The manufacturer receives a letter of 
intent from NWP. Based upon that expressed intent, the 
manufacture commits itself to do whatever is necessary to 
deliver the goods at the delivery date requested. In the event 
that NWP cancels its order, the manufacture has 
"work-in-progress" which must be stopped to mitigate the 
costs. Under these circumstances NWP is responsible for the 
legal detriment and costs incurred by the manufacturer for his 
"work-in-progress". Since the manufacturer would not have 
incurred this legal detriment if it were not for NWP's order, 
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NWP is clearly liable for the manufacturer's "work-in-progress" 
costs. 
In a like manner, NWP ordered the appellant's services 
and agreed to pay, not only for those services but for the 
"work-in-progress" associated with those services, e.g. the 
relocation of appellant's household. When NWP cancelled its 
order, NWP became responsible to the appellant to return things 
to their original condition just as in the illustration of an 
order for manufactured equipment. 
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Appeal Case, Supreme Court No: 890182 
(District Court Case No. C84-3608) 
(District Court Case No. C87-^0Q5) 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Dated January 2rd, 1991 
int pro se 
VERIFICATION 
I, A. P. Winter, declare and state as follows: 
I am a picu*\t\\f in the above entitled case. The declarant is 
a citizen of the United States, over the age of 21 years, and 
is competent to testify to the matters stated herein based upon 
his professional capacity as a former executive and manager of 
Northwest Pipeline Corporation. Declarant is a graduate of the 
University of Illinois where he received both undergraduate 
and graduate degrees. In his professional capacity declarant 
was provided with first-hand knowledge of the facts asserted. 
Declarant has read the contents of the foregoing appeal brief 
and reply brief and believes its contents to be true of hisown 
personal knowledge and as to those matters stated on 
information and belief he believes them to be true. The 
declarant is competent to testify as to these facts and if 
called upon the declarant could testify to these matters. Such 
testimony is based upon personal knowledge and not hearsay. I 
declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and 
correct. 
Executed on January 2nd, 199l at San D^^o^y California. 
Appellant pro se 
A. lp. WiiiWer 
<zs\ 
HELP WANTED HELP WANTED 
MANAGEMENT 
MANAGER, RESERVES 
AND EVALUATIONS 
As Manager of Reserves and Evaluations Department for one of 
the leaders in the gas transmission industry, you will be responsi-
ble for determining gas reserves, making deliverability forecasts 
and economic studies related to drilling and production of natural 
gas. Northwest Pipeline's transmission system traverses one of 
the most active gas supply areas in the country. Because of the 
low permeability reservoirs found throughout the Rockies, this 
area is one of the most technically challenging in the United 
States. In addition to your responsibilities in Salt Lake City, you will 
be responsible for well testing and evaluation from two field offices 
located in Western Colorado. 
As a member of Northwest Energy's team, your department will be 
working closely with others on projects such as gas processing, 
coal gasification and property acquisitions intended to help 
achieve the corporate growth objectives. 
You must have a bachelor's degree in petroleum or geological 
engineering with a minimum of 10 years technical and administra-
tive experience in the oil and gas industry. A solid background in 
petroleum reservoir engineering and well and reservoir simulation 
is also required. 
Northwest offers excellent company benefits and complete reloca-
tion package. For more information and immediate consideration, 
please send your resume in confidence to: NORTHWEST PIPE-
LINE CORPORATION, Attn: Fred Thomas, P.O. Box 1526, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84110, or call COLLECT (801) 534-3921, We are 
an Equal Opportunity Employer M/F/H, 
NORTHWEST 
PIPELINE 
CORPORATION 
OIL 4 GAS JOURNAL—NOV. 24, 1980 
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representative of the addressee noted above, on Jan. 2nd, 1991. 
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